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INTRODUCTION
Advertisements enjoy First Amendment protection because, as "tasteless
and excessive" as they may sometimes seem, our national economy depends on
the free flow of such commercial information to aid "intelligent and well
informed" private economic decisions.1 However, this First Amendment pro-
tection is not absolute. Advertisements, unlike political speech, are considered
commercial because they are "expression[s] related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience." 2 Consequently, state and local
lawmakers enjoy some latitude to define and restrict the dissemination of
advertisements in accordance with public policy. Within Nevada, the commer-
cial speech debate has historically concerned the extent to which the legislature
can restrict gaming advertisements. However, a matter of more current debate
concerns the legality of the restrictions placed upon advertisements for legal
brothel services.3
Despite prostitution's legality in certain Nevada counties, Nevada law sig-
nificantly limits the locations in which the brothels may advertise their services.
This Note discusses the constitutionality of these statutory restrictions in light
of current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the regulation of commercial
speech. Part I surveys the development of First Amendment protection granted
to commercial speech in general by the U.S. Supreme Court and explains the
two types of restrictions states or localities frequently utilize. Part II examines
the level of First Amendment protection granted to commercial speech con-
cerning vice activities or products.4 Part III explains the modern test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions. Part IV of this
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2007.
1 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
2 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
3 The American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada during the week of March 12, 2006 challenging the constitutionality of Nevada's
restrictions on advertisements by legal brothels. CITYLiFE newspaper and HIGH DESERT
ADVOCATE newspaper joined as plaintiffs. Lynnette Curtis, ACLU Joins Fight Against Lim-
its on Brothel Ads, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at BI.
' See infra notes 44-45.
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Note introduces the two types of statutory restrictions imposed on the adver-
tisement of legal prostitution in Nevada and analyzes the Nevada Supreme
Court's judgment upholding both restrictions. Finally, Part V applies the test
laid out in Part III to the two Nevada restrictions. This Note argues that were
the restrictions on brothel advertisement challenged, they would likely be found
not to advance directly the State's interest in reducing demand for prostitution
services by residents nor to be the least restrictive means by which the State can
achieve its asserted goal.
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. The Path to Constitutional Protection
During the first half of the twentieth century, commercial speech received
no First Amendment protection.5 Quite different from information and opinion
regarding matters of political and social importance,6 commercial speech was
viewed as an "irritating incident"7 or perhaps an "undesirable invasion."8 The
Court began to recalibrate the level of protection afforded to commercial
speech in 1964 by granting First Amendment protection to advertisements that
contained issues of social concern as well as incidents of commercial solicita-
tion.9 The Court noted that "[t]he relationship of speech to the marketplace of
products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of
ideas."'" Soon, the Court rejected completely any notion that commercial
speech should be denied all First Amendment protection.' In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court explicitly
held that speech with no other purpose than commercial solicitation was enti-
tled to some, albeit limited, First Amendment protection. 12
In Virginia State, the Court noted that the average person's interest in the
free flow of commercial information is "as keen, if not keener by far, than his
5 See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951) (upholding city ordinance
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions);Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (upholding statutory ban on commercial and business advertisements
on public streets or thoroughfares).
6 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing "speech concerning political and social issues of public importance" from
commercial speech).
7 Breard, 341 U.S. at 627.
8 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54-55.
9 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia., 421 U.S. 809, 811, 818, 822 (1975) (holding that a state
statute prohibiting the sale or circulation of any publication to encourage or prompt the
procuring of an abortion violated the First Amendment rights of a newspaper editor and that
although the advertisement offering abortion services had "commercial aspects," it still
received First Amendment protection because it also contained factual material of clear
"public interest"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that news-
paper's "editorial advertisement" was entitled to the same degree of protection as ordinary
speech, in the interests of keeping open an "important outlet for the promulgation of infor-
mation and ideas").
10 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
"1 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
12 Id.
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interest in the day's most urgent political debate."13 The Court repudiated the
distinction between speech of "public interest" or "importance" and speech that
is "entirely commercial," explaining that on its most basic level, advertising "is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling
what product, for what reason, and at what price."1 4 However, the Court never
granted commercial speech absolute equality with political or social speech,
holding instead that the inherent differences between commercial and more
traditional forms of speech justified its greater regulation:15
The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordina-
rily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or ser-
vice that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.
Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is
the Sine [sic] qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.
16
The resultant "objectivity and hardiness" of commercial speech justify its
greater regulation.17 For example, the state may mandate that the commercial
information appear in a certain form or contain warnings or disclaimers.
1 8
Even now, commercial speech does not command the same level of protection
as noncommercial speech, but instead receives "a limited measure of protec-
tion, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amend-
ment values."1 9
Untruthful or misleading commercial speech receives no First Amendment
protection, whereas truthful, legal, and nonmisleading commercial speech
does.20 The danger of "commercial harms" such as deception and overreaching
outweigh the utility of such speech.21 Indeed, the potential for mischief in the
bargaining process is the principal reason for drawing a distinction between
commercial speech and political or social speech."2 However, the same con-
cern for consumers that motivates regulation of untruthful commercial
messages "supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that provides con-
stitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading com-
mercial messages.""
B. Types of Prohibitions on Truthful, Lawful, Nonmisleading Commercial
Speech
Due to the distinctions between commercial speech and more traditional
forms of constitutionally-protected speech, local governments retain the author-
13 Id. at 763.
14 Id. at 765.
15 Id. at 772 n.24.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
20 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7 (1996) (citing Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)).
21 Id. at 502-03; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993).
22 Discovery, 507 U.S. at 426 n.21.
23 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496.
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ity to regulate commercial speech by "modes ... that might be impermissible
in the realm of noncommercial expression." 24 Typically, local legislatures
have utilized two types of regulations: the complete ban and the content-neu-
tral ban.
Where the regulation at issue constitutes a complete ban on truthful, legal,
and nonmisleading information, the Court has instructed that "special con-
cerns" arise.2 Such total prohibitions usually are not intended to protect
against commercial harms26 and are instead usually means to non-speech
related policy ends. 27 The underlying governmental policy often rests on pater-
nalistic concerns about how the public might misuse the speech if it were not
restricted. 28 The Court refuses to legitimize this legislative paternalism, instead
holding that the First Amendment requires the free flow of truthful information
and that people must be permitted to determine their own best interests.2 9
Complete bans insulate the state's unarticulated policy choices "from the visi-
bility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail" and thus permit the state
to manipulate its citizens by depriving them of the information needed to make
a free choice.3 °
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Services Commission
of New York, the Court struck down a New York Public Service Commission
regulation that prohibited all electric utilities in the state from promoting elec-
tricity use through advertising. 3 The regulation was a complete ban on truth-
ful, legal, and nonmisleading speech.32 The Court noted that it had in recent
years only approved such blanket bans where the speech itself was "either...
deceptive or related to unlawful activity."33 The concurrence expressed an
even broader view, arguing that the First Amendment requires that government
restrict information only in the face of "clear and present danger" and never for
a paternalistic purpose.34
Complete prohibitions on a particular topic of truthful commercial speech
about a lawful activity are therefore subject to the most rigorous First Amend-
ment review because they are "[in]consistent with the reasons for according
constitutional protection to commercial speech."' 35 That is, the free flow of
commercial speech affords people the opportunity to determine their own best
interests.3' The underlying policies governments seek to enforce by such bans
24 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
25 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500.
26 Id. at 502-03.
27 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
28 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976). Paternalistic legislation seeks to maintain public ignorance through "policies that
prevent men and women from hearing facts that might not be good for them." 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring).
29 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
30 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 571-72.
32 Id. at 566.
33 Id. at 566 n.9.
31 Id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
36 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
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can often be implemented without regulating speech.17 Complete restrictions
that have no purpose in protecting consumers from "misleading, deceptive, or
aggressive sales practices" require the "rigorous review that the First Amend-
ment generally demands."38
Different from complete prohibitions on commercial speech, content-neu-
tral restrictions "control only the time, place, or manner for disseminating
advertisements."3 9 Unlike bans on speech, content-neutral restrictions leave
open alternative methods of disseminating the information.4 ° Content-neutral
restrictions thus restrict consumer choice to a much lesser degree than complete
bans.4 ' Though the information is restricted, it remains available to the public,
and the restrictions are more likely to comport with the "typical reason[s] why
commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than non-
commercial speech."42 The legitimacy of the motives behind such content-
neutral restrictions and the avenues left open for dissemination of the message
justify a less strict review than that under which the Court analyzes complete
bans.4 3
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH: How MUCH PROTECTION Is AFFORDED TO
TRUTHFUL ADVERTISEMENT OF LAWFUL VICE ACTIVITIES?
A. The Posadas View
Within the broad category of commercial speech, certain speech concerns
activities that the state has the power to prohibit entirely, such as alcohol con-
sumption, gaming, and prostitution." Such activities are commonly referred to
as "vice" activities.45 When a state chooses to permit a certain vice activity
that it has the "greater power" to prohibit altogether, the state has been held to
also possess the "lesser power" to severely restrict advertisement of the activ-
ity.46 In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the
Court upheld the Puerto Rico legislature's decision to prohibit gaming enter-
prises from advertising to the nation's residents.47 The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico decided in 1948 to legalize certain forms of casino gambling.48
However, because the legislature intended the "games of chance" to entice
3' 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
38 Id. at 501.
31 Marrie K. Stone, Note, The Price Isn't Right: 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island Pro-
motes Free Speech in Commercial Advertising, 18 Lov. L.A. ENT. L.J. 133, 150 (1997).
40 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 502 (internal citations omitted).
43 Id. at 501.
44 Id. at 513 (acknowledging Rhode Island's power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages
outright); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986)
(acknowledging the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's power to prohibit casino gambling and
the general legislative power to prohibit prostitution altogether).
45 United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (describing lotteries and
gambling as "'vice' activit[ies] that could be, and frequently ha[ve] been, banned
altogether").
46 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
47 Id. at 331.
48 Id.
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tourists and thereby raise revenue for the nation, it decided to restrict the adver-
tisement of such gaming facilities to non-residents.4 9 The government prohib-
ited advertising to locals in an attempt to avoid those "serious harmful effects
on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens" that result from
excessive casino gambling.5 ° The Court acknowledged the legislature's right
to prohibit casino gambling altogether and held that this "greater power" neces-
sarily included the "lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."'"
This "greater includes the lesser" approach justified extremely restrictive
limitations on advertisement for vice activities for almost ten years. State legis-
latures were understood to have legitimate interests in regulating demand for
and access to "harmful" activities or products, such as alcoholic beverages,
gaming, and prostitution.52 The Court rejected any notion that the legalization
of an activity or product in turn required that advertisers enjoy full freedom to
publicize its availability. Indeed, state legislatures were held to retain the
authority to "forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity" as
they saw fit.53
B. The 44 Liquormart View
The "greater" finally ceased to include the "lesser" with regard to com-
mercial speech regulation with the Court's 1996 decision in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island.54 There, the Court invalidated a state statutory prohibi-
tion on advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages by rejecting the
"greater-includes-the-lesser" reasoning as "inconsistent with both logic and
well-settled doctrine."5 5 First, the Court discredited the logic underlying the
Posadas Court's assumption that the power to prohibit an activity entirely is
somehow "greater" than the power to prohibit speech about it.5 6 Rather, it is
illogical to permit state governments to prohibit entire categories of speech on
the basis that the power is subordinate to or "lesser" than the power to legalize
the activity because words and their dissemination may often prove to be more
vital to freedom than actions.5 7
More specifically, the Court proclaimed that the right to speak freely
weighs more heavily in the scale of democratic values than does the freedom to
engage in conduct.58 For example, a local prohibition on the instruction of
bicycle riding or fishing may curtail more freedom than the state's refusal to
permit bike riding within its limits or to provide fishing licenses.5 9 Often, the
freedom to speak about an activity or product is more crucial to the preserva-
49 Id. at 332.
50 Id. at 341.
51 Id. at 345-46.
52 Id. at 346.
53 Id.
14 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508 (1996).
55 Id. at 508, 511.
56 Id. at 511.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting the proverb "Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to
fish, and you feed him for a lifetime," id. at 511 n.19).
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tion of democratic principles than the freedom to partake of those activities or
products.6 °
Next, the Court elaborated on the error of the Posadas reasoning in light
of a more exacting analysis under the First Amendment.6 ' The Court examined
the text of the First Amendment, concluding that its guarantee of freedom of
speech reflects a presumption that the free flow of information is essential to a
democratic society. 62 The Court determined that the text's explicit guarantee
mandates that a government may not suppress speech as easily as it may sup-
press conduct.6 3 The Court then declared that the free-speech guarantee tran-
scends distinctions between speech concerning vice products or activities and
speech concerning commercial goods of a less "harmful" nature.' Freedom of
speech guarantees the right to disseminate commercial speech, and such right is
not lost "simply because [the state] may constitutionally prohibit the underlying
conduct."
65
A state's decision to permit vice activities or products by licensing its
providers does not alter the analysis. Although the state may decide not to
"provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit, it does not follow that
conferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional
right."6 6 Authority to license the provision of vice activities does not authorize
the state to prohibit the dissemination of truthful and accurate information
about the availability of the activity or product. Nonmisleading advertisements
for activities or products that a state may entirely prohibit do not constitute an
exclusive category of commercial speech and therefore must be regulated by
the same principles that apply to truthful commercial speech in general.
III. THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST FOR DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
Currently, the Court employs a four-part analysis in cases involving regu-
lations of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech. 67 First, to be entitled to
First Amendment protection, .the commercial speech at issue must concern a
lawful activity and must not be misleading.6" Second, for the restriction to be
valid, the state must assert a "substantial interest" to be achieved by its imposi-
tion. 69 Third, the restriction must "directly advance" the asserted governmental
interest.7 ° Lastly, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve the stated
purpose.7 '
60 Id.
61 Id. at 512.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 513.
67 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
[Vol. 7:548
BUT I THOUGHT THIS WAS SIN CITY
The first prong of the Central Hudson test questions whether the speech
sought to be regulated qualifies for First Amendment protection. 72 To satisfy
this prong, the speech at issue must concern a lawful activity, not be mislead-
ing,73 and propose a commercial transaction.7 4 The speaker bears the burden
of establishing compliance with this part of the test, as it is the speaker who is
in the best position to "evaluate the accuracy of [his] messages and the lawful-
ness of the underlying activity."
75
Often, proponents of speech that the government restricts or seeks to
restrict will attempt to classify their speech as non-commercial in an attempt to
receive the more substantial First Amendment protection afforded to political
or social speech.76 However, proponents of commercial speech may not avoid
regulation merely by "link[ing] a product to a current public debate."'7 7 Com-
bining the commercial elements of speech with other, non-commercial ele-
ments is an ineffective method of avoiding government regulation.78 Only
when commercial speech is combined with non-commercial elements by law or
by the nature of the speech may the speech avoid classification as
commercial.79
The second prong of the Central Hudson test requires the state to assert a
substantial interest that justifies restricting truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech.8" This step is designed to ensure that "lt]he regulatory technique...
extend[s] only as far as the interest it serves."8 Asserting a substantial interest
generally presents only a small hurdle as "[v]irtually any underlying regulatory
interest connected with furthering the public welfare" will satisfy the Court.82
For instance, the Court has considered as sufficiently substantial the goals of
energy conservation, fair and efficient electricity rates,83 reducing social ills
72 Id.
73 Id.
7' Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (applying the first
prong of the Hudson test to "Tupperware parties").
71 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381
(1977)); see also Hagar LaBouz, "Mommy, What's That Mean?": Commercial Speech Pro-
tection and the Hard Rock Hotel Advertisement Controversy, 1, 12 (2005) (unpublished
note, on file with the NEVADA LAW JOURNAL).
76 See Bd. of Trs., 492 U.S. at 474.
" Id. at 475 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
78 Id. at 474-75.
71 Id. at 474 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796
(1988)). In Board of Trustees, the Court refused to grant non-commercial status to "Tup-
perware parties" despite the discussion at such parties of financial responsibility and running
an efficient home. The Court rejected the contention that the commercial aspect of the par-
ties was "inextricably intertwined" with the non-commercial aspects. Instead, the Court held
that "[n]o law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching
home economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares." Id.
" Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
81 Id. at 565.
82 Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. Bus. L.J.
587, 600 (2000).
83 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69. The New York State Public Service Commission
ordered all electric utilities in the state to cease all advertising that would promote the use of
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associated with gambling, s4 and avoiding "strength wars" among producers of
alcoholic beverages.85
However, courts may refuse to accept generic statements of purpose, rec-
ognizing that they "tend to frustrate judicial inquiry into the real purposes of a
governmental entity in instituting a restriction on protected activity. '86 The
Eleventh Circuit, in Dills v. City of Marietta, Ga., rejected the proffered sub-
stantial interest of "safeguard[ing] life, public health, property and welfare,"
holding that the "mere incantation of esthetics" was insufficient.87 Even fur-
ther, where the regulation at issue is completely unsupported by a statement of
purpose, courts generally will not take judicial notice of unstated and unex-
plained purposes for restrictions on speech.
88
The third prong of the Central Hudson test calls for proof that the restric-
tion directly advances the asserted governmental interest.89 This third prong
seeks to ensure that the restriction makes a "meaningful contribution" to the
accomplishment of the cited ends.9" The government carries the burden of jus-
tifying its chosen restriction9" and must demonstrate that the particular method
will alleviate the asserted harms "to a material degree."' 2 Rather than deferring
to the legislative judgment that the chosen restriction is a proper method of
advancing the asserted interest, 93 the Court demands more from the govern-
ment than "mere speculation or conjecture." 94 The Court prefers empirical evi-
dence, but will settle for anecdotes, 95 as proof that the restriction chosen will
alleviate the stated harms to a material degree.96 A restriction will fail the third
electricity. The Commission's proffered interests were "energy conservation" and the "con-
cern that rates be fair and efficient."
84 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1999). A
federal statute prohibited some forms of broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gam-
bling. The Solicitor General asserted two interests: "(1) reducing the social costs associated
with 'gambling' or 'casino gambling,' and (2) assisting States that 'restrict gambling' or
'prohibit casino gambling' within their own borders." The Court accepted both interests as
substantial.
85 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995). The Federal Alcohol Adminis-
tration Act prohibited beer labels that displayed alcohol content. The Government defended
the prohibition as necessary to prohibit "strength wars," or the fear that brewers, left unregu-
lated, "would seek to compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their beer." Id. at
478-79.
86 Dills v. City of Marietta, Ga., 674 F.2d 1377, 1381 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
87 Id.
88 Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding state
ordinances banning off-site commercial advertising unconstitutional in the absence of iden-
tifiable government interests sought to be advanced).
89 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
90 Langvardt, supra note 82, at 601.
91 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983).
92 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993).
93 See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986).
9 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770.
91 See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995) (discussing the absence of
empirical, anecdotal, or any positive evidence to support the State's position in support of a
restriction on speech in Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771).
96 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).
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prong if it "provides only ineffective or remote support" for the stated
purpose.9 7
The third Central Hudson prong is the most difficult for government
restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading speech to pass.98 In 44 Liquormart, the
Court enunciated its concern that a complete ban on truthful commercial speech
contribute significantly to the accomplishment of the legislative goal.99 There,
Rhode Island failed to convince the Court that its complete ban on alcohol price
advertising directly advanced its asserted goal of promoting temperance. 1° °
Though the advertising ban might have dissuaded "temperate drinkers of mod-
est means," no evidence indicated that the ban would have any sort of signifi-
cant effect on consumption statewide.10 1 Further, where the state failed to
identify the price that would lead to a significant reduction in alcohol consump-
tion and that prices would drop in the absence of a ban, the Court refused to
fulfill the third prong by engaging in "speculation or conjecture." ' 0 2 The 44
Liquormart decision makes clear that a restriction on "accurate commercial
information" must directly advance the state's asserted ends. 10 3
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires the state to prove
that its commercial speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve its stated
purpose. 1° 4 In Board v. Fox, the Court emphasized at length that this fourth
prong did not require the restriction to be a perfect fit or "the single best dispo-
sition," but instead the restriction had to be merely "in proportion to the interest
served."10 5 The Court stressed its policy of deferring to state legislative deter-
minations of what manner of regulation may be best employed as long as the
decision was reasonable.10 6 However, through subsequent applications of the
fourth prong, the Court has consistently held state governments to the higher
standard spurned in Fox.
In 44 Liquormart for example, the Court invalidated a blanket ban on
advertising liquor prices because it failed prongs three and four of the Central
Hudson test.'0 7 Because it was "perfectly obvious" that alternative, less
restrictive regulatory methods of achieving the legislative goal of temperance
were available, the ban failed even the "reasonable fit" test.10 8 Similarly, the
Court refused to uphold a federal ban on alcohol content advertising where
9 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
" See id. at 569; Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771; Greater New Orleans Broad. v. U.S., 527 U.S.
173, 189 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 506-07 (1996). In each of the
cited cases, the restriction on commercial speech at issue failed to advance the asserted
interest directly.
99 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
100 Id. at 507-08.
10 Id. at 506.
102 Id. at 506-07. (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770).
103 Id. at 507.
104 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569-70
(1980).
105 Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
106 Id. at 479.
107 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 506-07.
108 Id. at 507.
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alternatives existed that would achieve the government's proffered interests
without intruding so greatly on First Amendment freedoms. '0 9 In practice, the
fourth prong requires a state to prove that no viable, less restrictive alternative
exists. As Justice Thomas recognized in concurrence, "[b]ecause direct regula-
tion of the activity itself will always prove to be a less restrictive means, regu-
lation of speech regarding the activity will always be more extensive than
necessary."1 1 In practice, then, when a state seeks to impose restrictions on
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech, it must prove the absence of any
less costly or less restrictive alternatives."'
IV. NEVADA'S STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON BROTHEL ADVERTISEMENTS
Nevada Revised Statute § 244.345 legalizes prostitution in counties with
populations of less than 400,000.112 County officials in each county have the
option of allowing legalized brothels to operate.1 13 Currently, brothels are
legal in eleven of Nevada's seventeen counties. 1 4 In 1913, the legislature
enacted N.R.S. § 201.430, which prohibits legal brothels, or any person acting
on behalf of any such brothel, from advertising any house of prostitution (1) in
any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on any public
highway; and (2) in any county, city, or town where prostitution is prohibited
by local ordinance or where the licensing of a house of prostitution is prohib-
ited by state statute. Thus, N.R.S. § 201.430 prohibits brothel advertisement in
any theater or along any roadway in counties in which prostitution is legal, as
well as advertisement anywhere in counties in which prostitution is not legal.
N.R.S. § 201.440 further prohibits any person or business owner from allowing
any person associated with a brothel to promote it through advertisement in his
or her place of business.
In 1981, the Nevada Supreme Court held that Nevada's highly restrictive
brothel advertising restrictions withstand constitutional attack.1 15 In Princess
Sea, the owner of a legal Nye County brothel and two newspaper publishers
challenged N.R.S. §§ 201.430 and 201.440, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief from enforcement of the statutes.' 16 Approaching the statutes with a pre-
sumption of constitutionality, the court declared that it would only declare an
act of the legislature unconstitutional if "it appear[ed] to be clearly in contra-
"o Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995).
11o Stone, supra note 39, at 153 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
... LaBouz, supra note 75, at 15.
112 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345(8) (West 2004). As originally enacted in 1959, the
statute permitted prostitution to be legalized only in counties with populations of 200,000 or
less. Brothel regulation has been ongoing since the creation of the Nevada Territory in 1861.
See Guy Louis Rocha, Presentation by Nevada State Archivist of the History of Prostitution
in Nevada (Aug. 4, 1999), http://www.bunnyranch.com/news/history/NevadaStateLibrary
and Archives.
113 Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 626 (Nev. 1980).
114 Daria Snadowsky, Note, The Best Little Whorehouse is Not In Texas: How Nevada's
Prostitution Laws Serve Public Policy, and How Those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J.
217, 224-25 (2006).
115 Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v. State, 635 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1981).
116 Id. at 284 (Manoukian, J., concurring).
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vention of constitutional principles." ' 1 7 The court noted the absence of U.S.
Supreme Court authority on the issue. Because the Court had not yet heard
even Posadas, it had not defined the degree of First Amendment protection
granted to commercial speech concerning vice activities." 8 Lacking definite
guidance, the court held that the statutory sections at issue did not "clearly
contravene constitutional principles as thus far articulated" by the Supreme
Court.l"9 For over thirty years since Princess Sea, brothel owners and opera-
tors have been partially restricted from advertising their services in counties in
which prostitution is legal and completely banned from advertising in counties
in which prostitution is illegal.
The Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Princess Sea must be re-
examined in light of the Supreme Court's 1996 determination in 44 Liquormart
that the power to prohibit an activity does not automatically confer to the state
the "lesser" power to proscribe its advertisement. In 44 Liquormart, the
Supreme Court made clear that the principles supporting a complete ban on
commercial speech about vice activities buckle under the weight of logic and
history.1 2 0 At the time of Princess Sea, the Nevada Supreme Court lacked
definite principles by which to guide its analysis. Because the Central Hudson
test has established itself as the "controlling analytical framework" in determin-
ing the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions,' 2 1 the remainder of
this Note will analyze the constitutionality of the restrictions through an appli-
cation of the test.
V. APPLYING THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST TO NEVADA'S STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING
Nevada statutory law contains two distinct restrictions on locations in
which the legalized brothel industry may advertise its services. First, N.R.S.
§ 201.430(1)(b) prohibits brothel advertisements "in any county, city or town
where prostitution is prohibited by local ordinance or where the licensing of a
house of prostitution is prohibited by state statute." Subsection (1)(b) thus
imposes a complete ban on the advertisement of this particular type of commer-
cial speech. Second, N.R.S. § 201.430(l)(a) prohibits this particular type of
commercial speech "in any public theater, on the public streets of any city or
town, or on any public highway." As a restriction on the place of advertise-
ment, subsection (1)(a) imposes a content-neutral prohibition on commercial
speech in those counties that allow prostitution.
A. Does the Speech Qualify for First Amendment Protection?
This first element of Central Hudson requires that the speech sought to be
regulated is truthful, nonmisleading, and concerns a lawful activity. Advertise-
ments concerning brothel services or activities do concern a lawful activity
'"1 Id. at 283 (quoting State ex rel. Tidvall v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 539 P.2d 456 (Nev.
1975)).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996).
121 Langvardt, supra note 82, at 599.
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because the Nevada legislature has legalized prostitution in counties with popu-
lations of less than 400,000.122 The existence of a "statutory licensing scheme
for houses of prostitution outside of incorporated cities and towns"1 23 guaran-
tees the legality of the conduct underlying the speech at issue.
There is no reason why advertisements concerning brothel services would
be misleading or untruthful.1 24 The goal of most advertising is to entice busi-
ness. As legitimate businesses, the brothel industry would likely not seek to
mislead their potential customers as to the nature or cost of their services
because untruthfulness would lead to less profit in the long run. Further, the
advertisements at issue in Princess Sea were not struck down on the basis that
the information sought to be conveyed was untruthful; the information con-
tained in the advertisements was not even at issue.1 25 It is reasonably certain
that brothel advertisements would be at least as truthful and nonmisleading as
any other advertised product in the marketplace.
B. Are the State's Interests Substantial?
In the absence of legislative history for the 1913 enactment of N.R.S.
§ 201.430,126 it is difficult to speculate about what motivated legislators nearly
a century ago. It is reasonable to presume that their intent related in some way
to preserving the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the state's citizens. The
restrictions embodied in N.R.S. § 201.430 are most similar to the restrictions
on gaming advertisements in Posadas. There, as discussed in Part II, the
Puerto Rico Legislature prohibited gaming enterprises from advertising to
Puerto Rican citizens.'2 7 By this restriction, the legislature sought to "reduc[e
the] demand for casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico."1 28 The
Supreme Court found this purpose legitimate, holding that the legislature's
interest in preventing the "disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the
increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corrup-
tion, and the infiltration of organized crime" was sufficiently substantial.' 29
It is likely that the legislative intent behind the passage of N.R.S.
§ 201.430 rests on analogous concerns for "preserving the quality of life in the
community at large." 130 This supposition is bolstered by other decisions of the
Nevada Supreme Court. In Kuban v. McGimsey, the court held that N.R.S.
§ 244.345, which permits houses of prostitution in counties with populations
less than 400,000, did not divest individual counties of the power to ban broth-
els completely.1 3 ' In so holding, the court alluded to the interests implicated by
the decision to permit or prohibit prostitution: "We recognize that community
122 NEV. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 244.435 (West 2004).
123 Nye County v. Plankinton, 587 P.2d 421, 423 (Nev. 1978).
124 Labouz, supra note 75, at 20.
125 Princess Sea Indus., Inc. v. State, 635 P.2d 281, 282 (Nev. 1981).
126 A thorough search of the legislative history revealed nothing informative about legisla-
tive motivation.
127 Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 332 (1986).
128 Id. at 341.
129 id.
130 Id. (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)).
131 Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 626 (Nev. 1980).
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standards and mores may differ from one community to another and even from
time to time in the same community and that the county governing body...
may see fit to adopt, repeal or amend ordinances to meet prevailing or then
contemporary conditions."' 3 2 In so stating, the court recognized the interests of
local government in respecting the prevailing moral standard of its residents.
Similarly, four years before the court's decision in Princess Sea, in
Oueilhe v. Lovell the court upheld a Las Vegas city ordinance prohibiting the
maintenance or advertisement of businesses offering the opportunity to wrestle
with members of the opposite sex where the court found that such enterprises
"utilize[d] wrestling as a subterfuge for sexual pleasure for pay between male
and female."' 3 3  The city cited extensive interests in prohibiting such
businesses:
[T]he operation of a business of providing wrestling partners of the opposite sex is
detrimental to the health and safety of the public and community.... such a business
is offensive to the public morals and decency .... such a business is detrimental to
the continued economic development of the community and tends to degrade the City
as a provider of good entertainment, and is harmful to the cause of attracting tourists
and visitors to the City. 
134
In Posadas, Kuban, and Oueilhe, the courts recognized legitimate govern-
ment interests in reducing the demand for the vice activity by residents in
efforts to preserve quality of life generally. The State of Nevada's interest in
prohibiting the advertisement of legalized houses of prostitution, both in coun-
ties in which prostitution is illegal and in public areas of counties in which it is
legal, would likely be the same. Nevada courts would probably "have no diffi-
culty in concluding"' 35 that the Nevada legislature's interest in reducing the
demand for prostitution services by its residents is a substantial government
interest.
C. Do the Restrictions Directly Advance the Asserted State Interest?
As a "critical" element of the Central Hudson test, the requirement of
direct advancement mandates that "the Government carr[y] the burden of show-
ing that the challenged regulation advances the Government's interest 'in a
direct and material way.' "136 Evidently, the Nevada legislature believes that
prohibiting brothel advertising in counties in which brothels are illegal and
restricting such advertising in counties in which they are legal directly
advances its interest in reducing the demand for brothel services by Nevada
residents. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that deference to legis-
lative judgment is no longer a basis for decision under this third prong.' 37
Instead, the state must prove that its chosen method of regulation allevi-
ates the recited harms to a material degree. 138 The Court approves of proof in
132 Id.
"I Oueilhe v. Lovell, 560 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Nev. 1977).
134 Id.
135 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
136 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
137 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 486 (1996).138 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993).
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the form of empirical studies as well as anecdotes.139 The statutory restrictions
at issue here are most analogous to those restricting gaming advertisements to
the residents of Puerto Rico in Posadas. However, the decision in Posadas
rested on reasoning no longer viable. The Court there upheld the prohibition of
gaming advertisements to Puerto Rican residents because the legislature "obvi-
ously believed" it directly advanced its goal.14 ° Such unquestioning deference
is no longer the Supreme Court standard for evaluation of the third prong.41
Rather, the State of Nevada must demonstrate that its chosen methods of
restriction directly advance its asserted interest. It is unlikely that, were the
issue presented to a court, either method of restriction would be found to
advance directly the State's asserted interest. The "irrationality of the regula-
tory scheme" '4 2 is evident when viewed in context. The Nevada Legislature's
decision to permit legalized prostitution represents a legislative judgment that
the economic benefits of permitting the industry outweigh any possible per-
ceived social ills that accompany it. 143 In its history as a mecca for debauch-
ery-seeking tourists, Las Vegas has celebrated its reputation as Sin City."
Not only does its newest advertising slogan embody its lascivious roots,145 but
Las Vegas is well known for "the shameless omnipresence of sex, in all its
possible commodified forms.
146
The State of Nevada would be hard-pressed to demonstrate direct
advancement of its asserted goals by the complete ban on all forms of brothel
advertisement in counties in which prostitution is illegal. To argue that the
State seeks to reduce demand by locals for this particular vice activity is non-
sensical when compared to the permitted promotion of the topless revues
147
139 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (stating "We do not, however,
require that empirical data come accompanied by a surfeit of background information. We
have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes
pertaining to different locales altogether.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
140 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42.
141 See supra notes 90-92; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490 (requiring more than "various tidbits" of
evidence to "overcome the irrationality of the regulatory scheme and the weight of the
record").
142 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490.
143 See supra note 132.
144 John Blackstone, Vegas Soars to Lavish New Heights, CBS NEWS, Sept. 19, 2004, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/19/sunday/main630587.shtml.
145 "What Happens in Vegas, Stays in Vegas." Newt Briggs, Slogan's Run, LAS VEGAS
MERCURY, April 8, 2004, http://www.lasvegasmercury.com/2004/MERC-Apr-08-Thu-2004/
23579319.html.
146 Kenneth Nguyen, This is Not Kansas, THE AGE, Apr. 30, 2005, http://www.theage.com.
au/news/United-States/This-is-not-Kansas/2005/04/29/1114635699824.html#top.
147 Bite, a show at the Stratosphere, features topless women dressed as vampires, Bite -
Entertainment in Las Vegas, http://www.stratospherehotel.com (follow "Entertainment"
hyperlink; then follow "Bite" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007); Folies Bergere at the
Tropicana features topless cabaret numbers, Tropicana Entertainment, http://www.tropi-
canalv.com (follow "Entertainment" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007); Fantasy at Luxor
features topless dance numbers, Luxor Entertainment, http://www.luxor.com (follow
"Entertainment" hyperlink; then follow "Fantasy" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007);
Crazy Girls at the Riviera is billed as the "sexiest topless revue," and Splash at the Riviera
features topless showgirls, Riviera Entertainment, http://www.rivierahotel.com (follow
"Entertainment" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007); Jubilee! at Bally's features topless
dancers, Bally's Entertainment, http://www.harrahs.com/EventsDetail.do?detailName=donn-
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and "sexual circus[es] of muscular men and slender women with small waist-
lines and pert breasts" 148 by local gaming enterprises to lure locals into their
casinos. 149  In Greater New Orleans, the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting advertisements of private casino gambling from broadcast by states
in which gambling is legal to states in which gambling is illegal. 5 ' The Court
condemned the federal statute because its "operation... and [ ] attendant regu-
latory [scheme were] so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the
Government [could] not hope to exonerate it."'1 51 The statute itself contained
exemptions that were "squarely at odds with the governmental interests
asserted."' 152 Here, the "infirmity" of N.R.S. § 201.430 is evident when con-
trasted with the Nevada legislature's "simultaneous encouragement"' 153 of the
use of sexually provocative shows to entice patrons to gamble and its failure to
regulate adequately the escort service and exotic dancing industry, well known
often to be a front for prostitution services. 1
54
It is unlikely that the State's interest in reducing demand for prostitution
by its residents is directly advanced by completely banning advertisements in
all counties in which prostitution is illegal. The Supreme Court instructs courts
to "review with special care" regulations that completely ban a particular type
of commercial speech as a means to a non-speech-related end. 155 Here, the
asserted state interest, while substantial, reflects the decision of the legislature
to impose its morals on residents. Because the end is "unrelated to the preser-
ardens-jubilee-detail&locationCode=BLV&eventTitle=DONN+ARDEN%27S+JUBILEE
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
148 Sonya Padgett, Supersize Sisters: Standing Out, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 19, 2003 at 1 J
(discussing the Zumanity show at the New York New York Hotel Casino).
149 See generally Denise Cardinal, Ordinance Would Allow Nude Shows in Downtown
Hotels, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 17, 1998 at A 4, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com
(discussing an amended City Ordinance that would permit Downtown casinos with more
than 300 rooms to feature nude dancers); Adam Goldman, Sin City Getting Sexy Makeover,
CBS NEWS, May 6, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/06/entertainment/main
552573.shtml; Jeff Simpson, Official: Some Resorts Allowing Risque Behavior, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., May 4, 2002, at Al, available at http://www.reviewjoumal.comlvrjhome/2002/
May-04-Sat-2002/news/18674152.html; Casino Watch - SEXessful Gambling, Sept. 2003,
http://www.casinowatch.org/_cw-files/sex-prostitution/sexessfulgambling.html (compiling
excerpts from various online news sites that discuss the growth of Las Vegas as an adult-
themed resort-town).
15o Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
151 Id. at 190.
152 Id. at 191.
153 Id. at 189-90.
154 See J. M. Kalil, Taxi Test Rides Yield Long-Hauls, Prostitution Offers, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Feb. 22, 2004, at B 1, available at http://www.reviewjoumal.com/lvrj-home/2004/Feb-
22-Sun-2004/news/23249445.html. Reporter J.M. Kalil posed as a tourist and took twelve
rides from taxis to and from McCarran Airport between noon and eight p.m. Three of twelve
cabdrivers solicited Kalil with business card-sized flyers advertising escort services, inform-
ing him that "the companies' dancing, escort service or other unspecified service was just
code for prostitution."; see also David Strow, Slot Machine Regulators Concerned About LV
Topless Club, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 13, 2001, at C3, available at http://www.lasvegassun.
com (discussing the pending decision of the Nevada Gaming Control Board whether to
revoke a topless club owner's gaming license due partly to concerns about a number of
dancers' prostitution-related arrests).
155 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980).
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vation of a fair bargaining process," a court would apply "rigorous" review.' 56
The complete prohibition on brothel advertising hinders consumer choice,
1 57
prevents the public from scrutinizing the state's policy choices, 158 and as such,
seeks to encourage public ignorance for paternalistic ends. A court would quite
likely hold that the complete prohibition on brothel advertisements in counties
in which prostitution is illegal fails to advance materially the State's asserted
interests because it floats alone in a sea of contradiction.
The content-neutral ban on brothel advertisements in counties in which
prostitution is legal may meet a different fate under this third prong. Nevada
law prohibits legal brothels from advertising "any house of prostitution in any
public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on any public high-
way."159 Thus, the State imposes a content-neutral restriction on the place of
expression.1 6 0 The State will likely find it easier to demonstrate that this
restriction directly advances its asserted interest in reducing demand for prosti-
tution services by residents.
Although the content-neutral restriction does not demand rigorous
review, 1 6 1 Nevada must still prove that the restriction advances its asserted
interests to "a material degree." '16 2 In Greater New Orleans, the Court rea-
soned that a partial restriction on broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino
gambling would likely "have some impact on overall demand for gambling."' 6 3
Similarly here, it is generally reasonable to assume that by removing advertise-
ments from view in commonly-frequented locations, fewer people visit and
purchase prostitution services.
However, the Court in Greater New Orleans also found it "reasonable to
assume that much of the advertising would merely channel gamblers to one
casino rather than another."''" Likewise, here it is questionable whether per-
mitting the advertising in places currently prohibited would create a marked
increase in demand for prostitution services. In 44 Liquormart, the Court
found that a complete ban on liquor price advertising did not directly advance
the state's interests in avoiding price wars between retailers because the margi-
nal price increase resulting from the absence of competition would not "signifi-
cantly reduce marketwide consumption.... the abusive drinker will probably
not be deterred by a marginal price increase and . . . the true alcoholic may
simply reduce his purchases of other necessities."' 65 Just as in 44 Liquormart,
156 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
157 Id. at 502.
158 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430 (West 2004) (emphasis added).
160 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
161 Id.
162 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
The Court began its opinion by stating, "[f]ederal law prohibits some, but by no means all,
broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gambling." Id. at 176. Despite the partial
restriction, the Court still mandated that the Government "demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Id. at
188.
163 Id. at 189.
164 Id.
165 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 506.
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the restrictions on speech here will not likely deter those people already partak-
ing of prostitution services. The State may assert that the restrictions help pre-
vent a new market for the services; however, the advertisement of brothel
services does not guarantee that people who do not currently solicit the services
will do so upon viewing the advertisements. In fact, it is reasonable to assume
that those residents who do not solicit the services currently are aware of their
availability and will not begin to partake upon viewing an advertisement. 166
There are many points of difference between bolstering the constitutional-
ity of the content-neutral restriction a complete ban. The content-neutral
restriction does not completely shield from view the underlying governmental
policy behind the restriction. 167 Residents are still able to view brothel adver-
tisements and determine for themselves whether to partake of the services
offered. Permitting individual people to determine their own best interests is
the reason the Court protects the dissemination of commercial speech in the
first place. 168 Thus, the content-neutral restriction does not "strike[ ] at the
heart of the First Amendment"1 69 so as to demand "rigorous" review. 170 None-
theless, the State of Nevada would have a tough time convincing a court that
the content-neutral restrictions directly advance its interest in reducing the
demand for prostitution services by its residents to a material degree. The
Court in 44 Liquormart reiterated its unwillingness to engage in "speculation or
conjecture" to find direct advancement of state interests by restrictions on
speech. 7 ' Although the proffered interest is substantial, if the restriction on
speech "lacks [a] close and substantial relation to the governmental interest[ I]
asserted, it cannot be, by definition, a reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tion."'1 72 Without proof in the form of empirical studies or anecdotes, a court
would probably hold the content-neutral restriction to fail the third prong.
D. Is the Restriction on Speech More Extensive than Necessary to Serve
the State's Asserted Interest?
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test calls for an evaluation of the
"fit" between the restrictions on speech and the asserted state interest. 173 While
the Court claims not to require the "least-restrictive-means,"' 174 in practice it
'66 See generally Barbara Brents & Kathryn M. Hausbeck, Pro-Family, Pro-Prostitution:
Discourses of Gender, Sexuality & Legalized Prostitution in a Nevada Town 3 (2000)
(unpublished paper presented before the Midwest Sociological Association, Chicago, Apr.
2000), http://www.unlv.edu/faculty/brents/research/msspaper.ely.pdf (commenting on broth-
els in Ely: "They are all but invisible, known only to regulars, locals, and those who have
either done intentional research or who have heard by word of mouth.").
167 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
168 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976). ("[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and.., the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them.").
169 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980).
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
170 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
171 Id. at 507 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
172 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 773.
173 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
174 Bd. of Trs., 492 U.S. at 480.
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always looks to find "alternative, less drastic measures" by which the state can
accomplish its asserted interest. 7 5 For instance, in 44 Liquormart, the Court
invalidated the ban on alcohol price advertising where it was "perfectly obvious
that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on
speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting temper-
ance."' 76 Again, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court refused to sanction
a federal regulation that prohibited displaying alcohol content on beer labels
when its goal of suppressing strength wars among brewers based on alcohol
level could have just as easily been achieved by "several alternatives."' 77 The
Court's enumeration of other options, "such as directly limiting the alcohol
content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol
strength ... ,or limiting the labeling ban only to... the segment of the market
[most vulnerable to strength wars]," was proof that the federal regulation was
more extensive than necessary.1
78
Beginning with the complete ban on brothel advertisements, it would be
nearly impossible for the State of Nevada to demonstrate that its asserted inter-
est could not be achieved by a more narrow restriction. The State bears the
burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that it has carefully calculated
the costs and benefits of the total ban,"' and that it is "no more extensive than
necessary."' 80 The State must therefore prove that there is no way other than
prohibiting all brothel advertising, regardless of content or place of dissemina-
tion, to deter residents who do not already patronize the brothels from becom-
ing customers. A court will likely be hesitant to sanction this paternalistic
legislation, which keeps people ignorant out of fear of what they might do with
the information.
The State has not yet measured the success of any less restrictive methods.
For instance, in an effort to maintain or decrease the number of married men
visiting the brothels, the legislature might regulate the content of advertise-
ments to mandate that the businesses include a disclaimer on any brochures,
billboards, or print advertisements advising potential customers of the possible
dangers posed to a marital or family relationship. Perhaps restricting the place
of dissemination in counties with populations of over 400,000, such as Las
Vegas and Reno, to freestanding news racks that can only be accessed by pay-
ment would avoid attracting new customers. Such a content-neutral restriction
on the place of advertisement would ensure that the information reaches only
those people actively seeking the services by mandating payment for access.
Perhaps the legislature could restrict the location of such news racks to the
Strip in Las Vegas and the major tourist centers in Reno and elsewhere to
further target tourists with the advertisements. Although none of these pro-
17 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993); see also Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570 (finding that the New York Public Service Commission's ban on
promotional advertising by the energy utility in the interest of conserving energy use failed
the fourth prong because no showing had been made "that a more limited restriction ...
would not serve adequately the State's interests").
176 517 U.S. at 507.
177 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490 (1995).
178 Id. at 490-91.
179 Discovery, 507 U.S. at 417.
180 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.
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posed methods may be a surefire way to restrict advertisements from residents
and reach only tourists, all are less restrictive than the complete ban currently in
place. Absent a strong showing that the current total prohibition is the only
method by which to achieve its goal, the complete ban would fail the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test.
The content-neutral restriction prohibits brothel advertising in any theater,
along any public street, or on any public highway in counties in which prostitu-
tion is legal. 181 This restriction appears to be more reasonable and less vulner-
able to challenge as overbroad. However, there are less-restrictive alternatives
available by which the State could achieve its interest in discouraging the use
of brothels by residents and encouraging use by tourists. For example, the leg-
islature could design a statutory scheme allowing advertisement of prostitution
along those public highways that run through the entire state. It would logi-
cally be by these roads that tourists would come upon the more rural Nevada
counties, so permitting advertising along such highways would likely increase
tourist traffic, and thereby revenue, in these counties.
This proposed method is not foolproof. Residents of Nevada and county
locals certainly travel on these major highways. However, the Nevada legisla-
ture has, in other contexts, recognized that the sparsely populated stretches of
freeway between urban areas may be governed by different laws than those
within urban areas. For example, N.R.S. § 484.3685 instructs generally that the
penalty for exceeding a 60- or 70-mile-per-hour speed limit by ten miles per
hour and a 75-mile-per-hour speed limit by five miles per hour is twenty-five
dollars.182 However, the statute exempts from this light fine roadways in urban
areas 183 that are located in counties with populations exceeding 100,000. Prac-
tically speaking then, drivers in Nevada will incur a twenty-five dollar fine
when speeding through sparsely populated areas of the state, but will incur
greater penalties when speeding in heavily populated locales. This scheme rec-
ognizes that the danger speeding drivers pose is greatest in areas of dense
population. 184
181 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.430(l)(a) (West 2004).
182 Id. § 484.3685.
183 Id. § 484.215 (defining "urban area" as "the area encompassed within the city limits of a
city whose population is 10,000 or more").
184 History of SB 137-1997 12, Exhibit G. The legislative history behind the enactment of
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3685 is replete with references to the differences between rural
and urban areas: "[Assemblyman Anderson] asked why the bill limited the top end speed by
only 5 m.p.h. and Senator Rhoads responded the 75 m.p.h. speed limits were mostly in rural
Nevada and he thought 75 m.p.h. was a safe speed while going 80 m.p.h. would not be."
Minutes of the Assembly Committee on Transportation, 1997 Leg., 69 Sess. 12 (Nev. 1997);
"Mr. Anderson asked if as a result of the bill, in places like the spaghetti bowl in Reno ...
local authorities might lower the speed limit below 45 to 50 m.p.h. to fit below the speeds of
the bill so that drivers would not speed in those areas. Senator Rhoads responded in heavily
urbanized areas such as the spaghetti bowl or 1-15 in Las Vegas perhaps an Amendment
could be proposed." Id. Additionally, the Nevada Department of Transportation ("NDOT")
was "strongly opposed" to the Bill's passage, but acknowledged its probable passage. Thus,
NDOT recommended two modifications to be made to the Bill "to lessen its adverse
impacts." Id. at Exhibit GI (Exhibit G is the Assembly Transportation Committee Hearings
on S.B. 137 Reducing Penalty for Speeders, prepared by NDOT Director Tom Stephens).
The second of the proposed modifications was as follows: "The lesser penalty proposed by
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Based on this premise, the Nevada legislature should design a permissive
brothel advertising scheme that allows advertisements on major highways
throughout the state but prohibits them nearer to urban centers. Such an
arrangement would accomplish the State's interest in minimizing business from
residents while maximizing tourist traffic. 185 The availability of less restrictive
measures to regulate brothel advertisement in counties in which the businesses
are legal makes it likely that a court would determine that the current restric-
tions fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
CONCLUSION
The State of Nevada would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that the current
restrictions on commercial speech directly advance its interest in reducing
demand for prostitution services by residents. The State would be similarly
hard-pressed to establish that the restrictions were the least restrictive available
by which to achieve the hypothesized interest. Unable to pass prongs three and
four of the Central Hudson test, litigation over the restrictions would likely
result in their invalidation, and the State would be forced to enact legislation
that comports with the level of protection granted to commercial speech about
lawful vice activities by the First Amendment.
However, certain alterations in the analysis might compel a different
result. For example, this Note hypothesized that the State's interest in enacting
the regulatory scheme was to reduce demand for prostitution by its residents.
Perhaps an alternative interest, such as a preserving the health, safety, welfare,
and morals of Nevadans generally would better stand up to constitutional scru-
tiny under the direct advancement prong. The Supreme Court has long-recog-
nized the power of the state to utilize its police power not only for suppression
of what is "offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary," but also for promotion of "the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety."1 8 6 Indeed, the State
might have little difficulty proving that restrictions currently in place directly
advance such broad and generalized interests.
Perhaps an analysis of the restrictions as "time, place, and manner" restric-
tions might yield a favorable result for the State.' 87 The Court has regularly
upheld city zoning ordinances aimed at limiting the areas of town where adult-
themed businesses can locate. 188 The State's prospects for success appear quite
good under such an analysis, as the Court has declared, "[r]easonable regula-
tions of the time, place, and manner of protected speech, where those regula-
tions are necessary to further significant governmental interests, are permitted
Bill SB 137 should not apply in heavily populated areas. Nevada may be like Montana or
Wyoming in its rural counties but there are nearly a million and a half people living in
Washoe and Clark County. The highways in and around these urban areas have a great deal
more traffic than the highways in the rest of Nevada." Id. at Exhibit G2-3.
185 See Curtis, supra note 3. Bobbi Davis, owner of the Shady Lady Ranch brothel near
Beatty, Nevada, explained her desire to advertise in counties in which prostitution is illegal:
"We can only advertise locally .... I live outside a town that has 1,100 people in it. We
don't want the locals, we want the tourists."
186 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 317, 318 (1907).
187 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
188 Id.; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976).
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by the First Amendment."' 8 9 However, to be valid, a time, place, and manner
restriction must "[be] justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."' 9° The State would therefore bear the burden of proving that the
restrictions on speech were not based on the content of the advertisements, but
instead on "the secondary effects of such [advertisements] on the surrounding
community."' 9 '
If the State were unable to convince a court of its content-neutral inten-
tions, it would be forced to confront "more careful" judicial scrutiny "to ensure
that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials
disapprove of the speaker's views."" 92 In Consolidated Edison, the Court
struck down the New York State Public Service Commission's order prohibit-
ing an energy utility from including inserts in its billing statements discussing
"controversial issues of public policy."' 93 The Commission acknowledged that
the distinction it had drawn between permissible and impermissible informa-
tional inserts was based precisely on content, and attempted to justify the dif-
ference "on the ground that consumers will benefit from receiving 'useful'
information but not from the prohibited information."' 94 The Court immedi-
ately discredited the Commission's rationale. 9 5 Under a time, place, and man-
ner analysis, the State of Nevada would bear the burden of proving that the
advertising restrictions were not based merely on content, and that even if they
were, the restrictions were justified for some reason other than disapproval by
public officials.
Notwithstanding alternative justifications, the current restrictions on
brothel advertisements do not directly advance the goal of reducing demand for
prostitution services by residents but encouraging demand by tourists. Brothels
are prohibited from advertising in the most popular tourist destination in the
state, Las Vegas, but permitted in smaller, rural counties. Further, the restric-
tions are not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The State has not experimented
with various less restrictive alternatives. In sum, Nevada's restrictions on
brothel advertisements do not provide a level of protection to truthful, nonmis-
leading commercial speech consistent with that required by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the First Amendment.
9 Young, 427 U.S. at 63 n.18.
190 Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)
(quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(distinguishing valid time, place, and manner restrictions from the impermissible prohibition
of prescription drug price advertising at issue)).
191 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. The City of Renton enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting
adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single-,
or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The Court upheld the zoning ordinance
as a content-neutral speech regulation, designed not to suppress free expression, but "to
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally protect
and preserve the quality of the city's neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of
urban life." Id. at 48 (internal citations omitted).
192 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (internal citations
omitted).
193 Id. at 532-33.
194 Id. at 537.
195 Id.
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